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In discussing proper methods of statutory construction, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter once wrote that, "it makes a great deal of difference
whether you start with an answer or with a problem."1 This perceptive
observation is equally applicable to the entire judicial process. It was
Holmes who taught us to focus upon the inarticulate major premise,2
for no doctrine is any more valid than the postulates from which it is
derived, no matter how impeccable may be its logic. Unless I misread
the current antitrust rulings of the Supreme Court, their premises
appear to run counter to the history, philosophy, purposes and lan-
guage of our antitrust statutes and jurisprudence. The Court has gradu-
ally been moving toward condemnation of all contractual restrictions
on trade and restatement of antitrust principles in absolute terms.3 Its
new major premises are unrelated to the preservation of competition
and the prevention of monopoly; it seems to be enough if the contract
restrains and thus limits the economic freedom of the parties. Accord-
ing to Mr. Justice Black, speaking for a unanimous Court in FTC v.
Brown Shoe,4 the central policy of the antitrust laws is to prohibit
"contracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open
market."r Similarly, last year in Pennington,G Mr. Justice White stated
that "restraints upon the freedom of economic units to act according to
their own choice and discretion... run counter to antitrust policy."
* This article is based upon an address delivered before the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York on September 27, 1966. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Michael Malina in the preparation of this article.
t Professor of Law, Columbia University. A.B. 1924, LL.B. 1926, Columbia Universlty,
LL.D. (honoris causa) 1965, Hebrew University.
J-. Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REy. 527,59(1947).
[2.] E.g." Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. Ray. 457, 465-66 (1897).[3.] See, e.g., UMW v. Pennington, 281 U.S. 657, 668 (1965); cf. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234(1964); Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 522 (1964)(Black, J., dissenting); Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249 (1945).[4.] 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
[5.] Id. at 321.
[6.] UMWV v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).[7.] Id. at 668. See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-1965, 40 N.Y.UL, RFv,
823, 834 (1965).
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Obviously there is nothing unusual in stressing such important ele-
ments as open markets and economic freedom in expressing antitrust
goals. However, any contract involves the mutual relinquishment of the
parties' freedom of action. It is subversive of the very nature of a con-
tract to say, without more, that neither party may circumscribe his
future course of action without violating the antitrust laws. The com-
mon law defined a contract in restraint of trade as a bargain "which
purports to limit in any way the right of either party to work or to do
business, whether as to the character of the work or business, its place,
the manner in which it shall be done, or the price which shall be
demanded for it... ," But since 1711,9 the law has not prohibited all
restraints of trade. Only the unreasonable restraint was condemned; and
this has been antitrust's central policy at least since 1911.10 To equate
any contractual restriction on the economic freedom of the parties with
antitrust illegality is thus to abandon the rule of reason.
The antitrust laws, either expressly or through judicial construction,
are couched in qualifying terms." But if the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, when acting under the spacious provisions of Section 5 of its
organic statute,'2 can dispense with the necessity of proving anti-
competitive effects, the conduct only qualifiedly forbidden by the
Clayton Act can be totally interdicted.13 We move towards absolutism
if the legality of horizontal mergers depends solely upon an increase in
concentration rather than on the likely impairment of the vigor of
competition. 4 Similarly, monopoly no longer signifies, in any realistic
sense, the power to set prices or to exclude others if markets are arti-
ficially constructed to suit the exigencies of the particular litigation.':
All this has not yet come to pass. But the signposts seem to point that
way. Moreover, last year's antitrust decisions compel us to ask whether
the policy predicates of these new premises are sound, viable or wise.
II. Exclusive Dealing and the Federal Trade Commission
Brown Shoe, the nation's second largest shoe manufacturer, sells both
through company-owned and independent retail stores. It makes cer-
[8.] 5 W I STON, CoNMIaCrS § 1633 (rev. ed. 1937).
[9.] Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wins. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (K.B. 1711). See HuNDwm,
CAsEs oN TpRA E RGULAmON 103-49 (3d ed. 1960).
[10.) Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
[11.] Sherman Act, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (190-); Clayton Act,
§§ 2, 3, 7, 8, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14, 18, 19 (1964).
[12.] 38 Stat. 717, 719 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1964).
[13.] See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
[14.] See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 584 U.S. 546 (1964).
[15.] See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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tain benefits available, free of charge, to those independents who agree
to "concentrate" their purchases on Brown's make of shoes and not to
buy, stock or resell competing lines.16 Over 760 retailers entered into
this program, 17 either by formal written agreement or orally. Pursuant
to the arrangement, the franchisees purchased an average of 75% of
their shoe requirements from Brown,'8 amounting to more than $24-y-2
million annually, 9 and representing approximately 1% of total shoe
sales nationally. 20
The Commission 2' held that Brown's purchase system constituted an
unfair trade practice under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act because it "effectively foreclosed [Brown's] competitors from sell-
ing to a significant number of retail shoe stores .... ',22 Alternatively,
the Commission went on to find that the record also established a
"prospective competitive impact"23 sufficient to meet the standard of
illegality of Section 3 of the Clayton Act.2 4
[16.] FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 318 (1966). The clause in question states:
"In return (for receiving benefits] I will ... concentrate my business within the grades
and price lines of shoes representing Brown Shoe Company Franchises of the Brown
Division and will have no lines conflicting with Brown Division Brands of the Brown
Shoe Company." Ibid. The franchise benefits included "architectural plans, costly mer-
chandising records, services of a Brown field representative, and a right to participate
in group insurance at lower rates than the dealer could obtain individually." Ibid.
[17.] Brown Shoe Co., TRADE REG. REP. 16316 at 21141-42 (F.T.C. 1963) (766 stores
by October 1961); Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45, 49 (8th Cir. 1964) (767 stores
by October, 1961). The Supreme Court apparently adopted the figures in the Com-
mission complaint which alleged "approximately 650 Brown Franchise Stores" as of
October, 1959 (Complaint, p. 3), since Mr. Justice Black speaks of "some 650 retail
stores." 384 U.S. at 317.
[18.] TRADE REG. REP. 1 16316, at 21142. "This percentage . . . in the case of in-
dividual stores may vary from 60 to a high of 95%."
[19.] Id. at 21145.
[20.] Id. at 21144. The number of stores under the franchise plan was also ap.
proximately 1% of the national number of retail shoe outlets, not including cobbler
shops, drug stores and other outlets with a limited selection or a small proportion of shoes
to total inventory. Ibid. Under any reasonable standard, the amount of business fore-
closed was accordingly minimal. The 760 franchised stores being 1% of some 70,000
outlets, and Brown's $25 million in franchise sales constituting 1% of approximately
$2.5 billion in annual shoe sales, Brown's competitors still had open to them some
69,300 stores and 2 billion 200 million dollars worth of business.
[21.] The Commission's opinion was written by Chairman Dixon. Commissioners
Anderson and Higginbotham did not participate, and Commissioner Elman concurred in
the decision and order but not in the Commission's opinion. Chairman Dixon's opinion
thus represented the views of himself and Commissioner MacIntyre.
[22.] Brown Shoe Co., T.AD REc. REP. 16316, at 21144 (F.T.C. 1963).
[23.] Id. at 21145.
[24.] 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964):
It shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce .. . to . .. make a
contract for sale of goods .. . for use, consumption or resale .. . or fix a price
charged therefor, or discount from ...such price, on the condition, agreement, or
understanding that the ... purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods.. ,
of a competitor or competitors of the ... seller, where the effect . . .may be to
substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of com-
merce.
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On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed,2 holding that there had
been a failure to prove an exclusive dealing arrangement violative of
either statute.
The Supreme Court, in setting aside the decision of the Court of
Appeals and reinstating the Commission's order, confined itself to the
Section 5 holding. Relying on the Commission's "broad power" to
declare unfair "trade practices which conflict with the basic policies of
the Sherman and Clayton Acts even though.., not actually [violative
of] these laws," 26 the Court held that it was unnecessary for the Com-
mission to find a reasonable likelihood of a substantial lessening of com-
petition, the sine qua non of a Section 3 violation. This was because
"the Commission has power... to arrest trade restraints in their in-
cipiency,"27 and Brown's program "conflicts with the central policy of
both § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 3 of the Clayton Act against con-
tracts which take away freedom of purchasers to buy in an open mar-
ket."2 Significantly, the Court did not characterize this central policy
as curbing unreasonable restrictions on purchasers' freedom or pre-
venting restraints which may substantially lessen competition. Rather,
the freedom to which it refers is absolute and unqualified.
I have discussed exclusive dealing arrangements at various times in
this series of annual reviews.2 9 Repeated comment was necessary be-
cause the views of both the Supreme Court 0 and the Commission 1
have oscillated on the applicable standard of illegality, and sometimes
divergently.
Without repeating my prior analysis of the legislative history, suffice
it to say that Congress, after mature and careful deliberation in 1914,
was unwilling to leave the legality of exclusives to the uncontrolled
discretion of the Federal Trade Commission, but specifically legislated
on the problem in Section 3.32
[25.] Brown Shoe Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 45 (8th Cir. 1964).
[26.] 384 U.S. at 321.
27.] Id. at 322.
[28.] Id. at 321.
[29.] E.g., Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE L. 75, 81-88 (1961);
Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 9 THDi R:coRD 171, 180-84 (1954).
[30.] Compare Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922),
with Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 US. 293 (1949), and Tampa Elcc. Co.
v. Nashville Coal Co., 865 U.S. 320 (1961).
[31.] Compare Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953), with Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc.,
57 F.T.C. 717 (1960).
[32.] The original House bill would have outlawed all cxclusives. H.IL 15657, 63d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). The Senate Judiciary
Committee, however, recommended deletion from the bill of any reference to exclusives on
the theory that they could best be handled by the Federal Trade Commission. 51 CoG.
REc. 13849 (1914). The Senate voted to drop the reference to exclusives. Id. at 14273. The
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The Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the statute was in
Standard-Magrane,33 where it emphasized the seller's market domin-
ance. This was abandoned as the test of illegality in Standard Stations,84
where Mr. Justice Frankfurter fashioned a rule of comparative quanti-
tative substantiality-if the market share foreclosed by the exclusive is
substantial, the statute has been violated. Several years later, in Maico 8
the Commission held that, even though the courts might be ill-equipped
to make a discriminating economic analysis to determine the impact
of an exclusive on competition, it, as an expert body, could and would
make such an investigation in assessing its legality.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Motion Picture Advertising,0 decided
the same year as Maico, added to the confusion. In that case Mr. Justice
Douglas, in a broad dictum, suggested that in challenging exclusives
under Section 5, the Commission might apply an even more stringent
standard of illegality than Standard Stations provided for Section 3
cases.
87
But the pendulum continued to swing back and forth. Within a
span of five months the Commission and the Court had switched posi-
tions. In Mytinger & Casselberry,38 the Commission jettisoned Maico
and adopted the quantitative substantiality rule of Standard Stations,
while in Tampa Electri&9 the Supreme Court, while not repudiating
Standard Stations in so many words, refused to limit its inquiry to the
substantiality of the amount of commerce foreclosed, indicating that
other factors were also pertinent, such as the relative strength of the
parties and the probable immediate and future effects of the arrange-
ment on effective competition in the relevant market.40 It is in the
context of this fip-flopping that Brown Shoe must be appraised.
Conference Committee adopted the qualifying language of the present statute. S. Doe.
No. 585, 63d Cong. 2d Sess. (1914); 51 CONG. REC. 15637-40 (1914). See Handler, Recent
Antitrust Developments, 71 YALE LJ. 75, 85-86 (1961).
[33.] Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 846 (1922).
[34.] Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). See HANDLE, ANTI-
TRUST IN PErVmEp~c 29-48 (1957).
[35.] Maico Co., 50 F.T.C. 485 (1953).
[36.] FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
[37.] Id. at 394-95.
[38.] Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 57 F.T.C. 717 (1960).
[39.] Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
[40.] To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to weigh the probable
effect of the contract on the relevant area of effective competition, taking into account
the relative strength of the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved In
relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market area, and the
probable immediate and future effects which pre-emption of that share of the market
might have on effective competition therein. It follows that a mere showing that the
contract itself involves a substantial number of dollars is ordinarily of little con-
sequence.
365 U.S. at 329. (Emphasis added.)
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Mr. Justice Black's opinion, though brief, is not free of ambiguity.
The case may stand for a very narrow proposition. Mr. Justice Black
states that the question before the Court is whether the Commission
can declare it unfair for "the second largest manufacturer of shoes in
the Nation... to secure a contractual promise from [hundreds of cus-
tomers] that they... will not purchase conflicting lines of shoes from
Brown's competitors."4' 1 And he concludes that the Commission has
such power "on the record here."-' Does this mean that the decision
is limited to the facts of the particular case before the Commission,
which involved a leading nationwide seller having a network of more
than 600 customers subject to the restriction, with the inevitable con-
comitant foreclosure of competing sellers?43
Another construction is possible. The Commission's opinion stated
that Section 5 was violated because Brown's competitors were fore-
closed "from selling to a significant number of retail shoe stores.""
And Mr. Justice Black also stressed the number of foreclosed outlets.
Does the case therefore stand for the proposition that the Commission
may apply a standard of absolute quantitative substantiality-the num-
ber of outlets or dollar volume foreclosed-in assessing the validity of
exclusives? This, of course, is the rule applicable to tie-ins 5 (but not
exclusives) under Section 3. In this connection it is noteworthy that
the Commission likened the challenged program to a de-in because
the receipt of benefits was conditioned on accepting the exclusive. 4
[41.] 384 U.S. at 320.
[42.] Ibid.
[43.] The Commission relied on the record in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294 (1962), in which the Brown-Kinney merger was invalidated in light of all the economic
facts concerning potential foreclosure of Brown's competitors from Kinney's outlets which
represented less than 1% of national shoe sales after the acguisition. See Brown Shoe Co.,
TRADE REG. REP. 16316, at 21144-45 (F.T.C. 1963). Commissioner Elman concurred relying
solely on the record of the merger case. Id. at 21150.
[44.] Id. at 21144.[45.] When the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in the market for the "tying"
product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the "tied" product is restrained, a
tying arrangement violates the narrower standards expressed in § 3 of the Claton Act
because from elther factor the requisite potential lessening of competition is inferred.
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 60309 (1953).
[46.] "Respondent's practice of conditioning the benefits of membership in the plan to
adherence to the restrictive terms of the franchise agreement for the purpose of foreclosing
other manufacturers from selling to its franchisees is akin to the operation of tying clauses
generally held as inherently anticompetitive." Brown Shoe Co., TADE RrEc. REP. 5 16316,
at 21144 (F.T.C. 1963). It may be that the Commision treated the case in this fashion,
bringing the proceeding under Section 5 rather than Section 3, because it was not certain
that Brown's franchise plan fell within the language of Section 3. Since the independent
shoe stores were free to continue to buy shoes from Brown without accepting the exclusive(they would, of course, lose the franchise benefits), Commission counsel may have felt that
the "sale" was not made "on the condition" that the purchaser "not use or deal in the
goods ... of a competitor or competitors of the .. seller," as Section 3 requires. On the
other hand, the statute prohibits discounts to induce an exclusive, and the franchise
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But if the Supreme Court intended to sanction the Commission's ap-
plication of the tie-in test to exclusives, contrary to the distinction
drawn between these two restraints in Standard Stations,47 one would
expect an explicit declaration to that effect.
The opinion can be read yet another way. Does Mr. Justice Black
mean that the Commission, under Section 5, may rely upon its "ex-
pertise" to strike down any exclusive dealing arrangement which, in its
unlimited discretion, it deems improper? There is language in the opin-
ion capable of such a construction. It is said that the Commission has
"broad power ... [to declare unfair], trade practices which conflict
with the basic policies" of the antitrust laws, 48 and that the "central pol-
icy of both § 1 ... and § 3 ... [is] against contracts which take away
freedom of purchasers to buy in an open market." 49 Taking the Court
literally, every exclusive conflicts with that policy because the buyer,
when he agrees to purchase only from the seller, by definition loses
his freedom to buy from others.
Brown Shoe may also have implications going beyond the law of
exclusives and affecting antitrust in general. Has the Court, in the name
of arresting trade restraints in their incipiency, issued the Commission
a blank check to prohibit any restrictive arrangement regardless of
whether it runs afoul of the antitrust laws? 0 Does the case mean, for
example, that the Commission, in enforcing Section 2(a) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act,51 need find only a price difference and may dispense
with the statutory element of probable injury to competition? Will
the Commission be free to prohibit a merger without finding a likeli-
hood of a substantial lessening of competition? Can it dispense with the
rule of reason inquiry in Sherman Act cases?
If this is the real meaning of Brown Shoe, the decision raises grave
issues far beyond the law of exclusive dealing. Is it consonant with our
democratic traditions to permit an administrative agency to refashion
statutory standards of legality with no limit other than the vague
concept of incipiency? This problem is particularly acute in antitrust,
benefits could be construed to constitute a discount or rebate. In any event, the Supreme
Court's opinion treats the case as an exclusive which could have been brought under
Section 3.
[47.] Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-08 (1949).
[48.] 384 U.S. at 321.
[49.] Ibid.
[50.] It should be noted that, pursuant to Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat 734
(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1964), the Commission is specifically empowered to enforce Sections
2, 3, 7 and 8 of that statute.
[51.] 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1964).
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where the statutory standards themselves are very broad with a wide
zone for judicial and administrative interpretation.
This notion that the Commission has authority to condemn activity
which, if full blown, would violate the Clayton Act is, to say the least,
anomalous. The Clayton Act itself is designed to arrest acts and prac-
tices in their incipiency52 which, when mature, could rise to the level
of unreasonable restraints of trade or monopolization forbidden by the
Sherman Act. That is why the statute talks of probabilities. To assert
that the Commission may arrest incipient Clayton Act violations is to
prohibit incipient incipienciesOa-which could have the effect of con-
verting qualified into absolute prohibitions or of substituting the mere
possibility of competitive harm for the reasonable probability which
hitherto has been the test. 4 And the suggestion that the Commission,
as an expert body, is better equipped than Congress or the courts to
fashion appropriate rules is belied by the fact that the Commission's
approach to exclusives has been anything but a model of consistency
over the years.
Nobody today would argue for a stingy construction of the Com-
mission's power akin to that in Gratz.r5 That decision, widely criticized
ever since it was handed down, unduly limited the Commission's
ability to apply Section 5 dynamically. 0 The concept of unfair competi-
[52.] See the Senate Report on the Clayton Bill, S. Rrt. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1
(1914), quoted in United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586. 597 (1957).
[53.] See Gordon, Walking Backward into the Future, How To CoktuLv u-Tni Tim
AnTcrrusr LAs 45, 48 (Van Cise & Dunn ed. 1954). Both the Federal Trade Commission
and the Clayton Acts were intended to arrest in their incipiency anticompetitive practices
which, if uncurbed, might develop into full-grown violations of the Sherman Law. Thus,
Senator Newlands, the Senate floor manager of the Federal Trade bill, stated as its
purpose: "Wge want to check monopoly in the embryo." 51 Coo. REG. 12030 (1914). See
also 51 CONG. REc. 11455, 14938 (1914). The Clayton Act is to the like effect. Thus, the
Senate Report on the Clayton Bill states:
Broadly stated, the bill, in its treatment of unlawful restraints and monopolies, seeks
to prohibit and make unlawful certain trade practices which, as a rule, singly and
in themselves, are not covered by the Act of July 2. 1890 [the Sherman Act], or other
existing antitrust acts, and thus, by making these practices illegal, to arrest the
creation of trusts, conspiracies, and monopolies in their incipiency and before con-
summation.
S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1914) (Emphasis added)
The legislative record is dear that the Commission was authorized to enforce the specific
prohibitions of the Clayton Act by proceeding under that enactment or under its own
organic law. See Section 11 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 21 (195; 51 Co.%c. REc.
11108-12, 11230-31 (1914). There is no evidence whatever that the Commission uas em-
powered under the Trade Commission Act to prohibit incipient violations of the Clayton
Act. The incipiency concept, wherever used, related to Sherman Act violations exclusively.
See 51 CONG. Rac. 11455, 12030, 14938 (1914).
[54.] E.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962).
[55.] FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
[56.] See Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over False
Advertising, 31 COLimr. L. Rav. 527, 545 (1931).
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tion should be flexible; but it should develop like any common law
principle-interstitially, by addition or subtraction, and by reasoned
analysis. That is a far cry from permitting the Commission, in areas
explicitly governed by statute, to formulate standards different from
those established by Congress or operate with no standards at all.
It is this apparent absence of any guiding standard which makes the
Brown Shoe opinion potentially dangerous-more dangerous than
Grand Union r7 where the Commission applied Congressional pro-
scriptions analogously to an area arguably left uncovered by inad-
vertent omission. "" Now the Commission has been given authority to
deal with cases squarely within the ambit of a specific provision of the
Clayton Act without having to apply the statutory test. If exclusive
dealing arrangements are inherently anticompetitive with no possible
justification, why should they not be prohibited per se by the courts
under Section 3? If the answer is that the judiciary does not have the
authority to read Section 3 to permit of such a rule, is it a fair reading
of the legislative history or indeed of the Federal Trade Commission
Act itself that Congress gave such broad power to the Commission? If,
on the other hand, an absolute quantitative substantiality rule is ap-
propriate, or any other standard for that matter, why should it be a
proper guide in one forum and not in the other?
But the underlying policy question is even more fundamental. What
are the anti-social consequences, if any, of exclusive dealing arrange-
ments? Are they all perniciously anticompetitive with no redeeming
virtues? Are they all innocuous with no reprehensible anticompetitive
effect? Are some bad and others good? If so, what is the criterion for
determining which arrangements fall into which category? Should not
that criterion be based on the ultimate purpose of antitrust to preserve
competition, rather than to unrelated social goals? In any event, is
there any justification for our being left in the dark about the policy
postulate of the new rule?
For me the policy issue is quite simple. The legality of an exclusive
depends upon the particular facts of each agreement. It may in some
circumstances impair and in others strengthen the competitive forces
in the relevant market. That is why neither the common law, the
Sherman Act nor the Clayton Act has condemned all exclusives out
[57.] Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962).
[58.] The case involved the Commission's authority, under Section 5, to find that the
inducement of unlawful promotional allowances was unlawful as violative of the spirit of
the Robinson-Patman Act even though the statutory language did not reach such behavior.
See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 71 YAL. L.J. 75, 90-98 (1961).
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of hand. Where no substantial anticompetitive effect is likely, the
freedom which should be protected is the freedom to contract, not the
freedom to buy in a market untrammeled by any restriction, however
reasonable.
III. Mergers and Markets
Each of the past several years has witnessed a new act in the unfold-
ing drama of Section 7 as applied to horizontal mergers,3 Each year the
noose became tighter and tighter.00 This year the judicial playwrights
sprung the trap door."' If Joe's DelicatessenO2 has not yet become the
law of the land, at the very least, its methodology has been accorded
the flattery of judicial imitation.
The evolution of the judicial construction of amended Section 7 as
applied to horizontal mergers has been remarkably swift. The curtain-
raiser of this four-act play was Brown Shoe,6 decided in 1962. There
Chief Justice Warren provided a comprehensive and what appeared to
be authoritative exegesis of the statute, ruling that each merger is
unique and must be functionally viewed in the context of its particular
industry; that per se rules are inappropriate; and that statistics alone are
insufficient to determine whether a given acquisition is likely to sub-
stantially lessen competition.
The doctrine of Brown Shoe withered in Act Two. Philadelphia
National Bank,64 decided in 1963, announced a rule of presumptive
illegality when a merger "produces a firm controlling an undue per-
centage share of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase
in the concentration of firms in that market .... .", What is more, in a
pregnant footnote, Mr. Justice Brennan added that, ..... if concentration
is already great, the importance of preventing even slight increases in
concentration... is correspondingly great"l The merger, producing
a firm with a 30% share of a market in which the top four banks con-
trolled 78%, was held unlawful.
[59.] Handler, Fifteenth Annual Review of Antitrust Devclopments--1962, 17 Tim
RucoRD 411, 427-41 (1962); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments; 112 U. PA. L. Rm.
159, 171-83 (1963); Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments-196f, 63 hfcu. L REv. 59,
67-78 (1964).
[60.] United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v.
Aluminum Co., 377 U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. Philadelphia Nat Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).[61.] United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).[62.] Hander, Recent Antitrust Developments-964, 63 Mictr. L. RPEv. 59, 70-78 (9M4).
[63.] Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-23 (1962).[64.] United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 821 (1963).
[65.] Id. at 363.
[66.] Id. at 365 n.42.
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Act Three was in two scenes, Alcoa-Rome 7 and Continental Can,6
but the plot was the same in both. A slight (as distinguished from
significant) increase in concentration in already highly concentrated
industries was declared, without more, to be unlawful. Mergers re-
sulting in combined market shares of 29% and 25% were prohibited
even though the increase in the market share of the acquiring com-
pany as a result of the merger was only in the 1 to 3 % range.
The stage having thus been set, last Term's decisions in Von's
Grocery 9 and Pabst70 brought down the curtain on the Final Act. Von's,
the third ranking food chain in the Los Angeles area, acquired Shopping
Bag, the number six company.1 Together they became the second
largest chain with sales of about $172 million annually and a market
share of 7-1/2 %.72 Both companies had impressive records of growth by
internal expansion prior to the merger. In a ten-year period Von's had
practically doubled the number of its stores, from 14 to 27, while
Shopping Bag went from 15 to 34.73 At about the same time the number
of single store operators in Los Angeles decreased from 5,365 to 3,818.14
By 1963, three years after the merger, there had been a further drop
to 3,590.75 During roughly the same period, the number of chains with
two or more grocery stores increased from 96 to 150.70 "While the
grocery business was being concentrated into the hands of fewer and
fewer owners, the small companies were continually being absorbed
by the larger firms through mergers." 77 Thus, from 1949 to 1958 nine
of the top 20 firms acquired 126 stores from their smaller competitors. 8
Mr. Justice Black, writing for a six-man majority,7 invalidated the
merger solely on the basis of the facts that I have just outlined: "These
facts alone are enough to cause us to conclude contrary to the District
Court that the Von's-Shopping Bag merger did violate § 7.#"8)
The Court's opinion derives logically from Mr. Justice Black's funda-
mental premise: that the basic purpose of Section 7 "was to prevent
[67.] United States v. Aluminum Co., 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
[68.] United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
[69.] United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
[70.] United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
[71.] 384 U.S. at 272.
[72.] Ibid.
[73.] Ibid.




[79.] Justices Stewart and Harlan dissented; Mr. Justice White wrote a concurring
opinon and Mr. Justice Fortas did not participate.
[80.] 384 U.S. at 274. (Emphasis added.)
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economic concentration in the American economy by keeping a large
number of small competitors in business."' If Section 7 is indeed an
anti-concentration statute, and if concentration means, as Mr. Justice
Black states, "a total decrease in the number of separate competitors,"8 12
then it follows inexorably that a horizontal merger in a market in which
the number of firms has decreased is violative of the statute. The diffi-
culty with this syllogism is that the major premise is faulty. Section 7
is not an anti-concentration statute pure and simple; a statutory viola-
tion presupposes proof that competition is likely to be diminished,
and such impairment is not the inevitable result of an increase in con-
centration. Moreover, Mr. Justice Black's notion of concentration is,
to say the least, novel; it goes far beyond what was heretofore accepted
to be the understanding of that term and what the Solicitor General
argued to the Court in his Von's brief.
Concentration, both in economics and in law, has traditionally meant
the collective economic power, measured by market shares, of the
leading firms in a line of commerce.8 3 Thus, the Solicitor General, in
arguing for the illegality of the merger, set forth the Government's
proposed rule in terms of market power and tendency towards oligopoly.
According to the Government's brief, "a merger between direct com-
petitors which occurs in a market still relatively unconcentrated but
beginning to display the attributes and symptoms of oligopoly, and
which contributes appreciably toward further concentration of that
market, violates Section 7 .... ."84 In explaining this proposed criterion,
the brief went on to talk about the "transformation of small-firm,
relatively unconcentrated markets into markets dominated by a few
large and powerful sellers,"8s5 and the Government stressed the im-
portance of the market shares of the 10 largest sellers in assessing the
relative state of concentration of the market.80
[81.] Id. at 275.
[82.] Id. at 273 n.3.
[83.] "Through years of usage the term 'concentration ratio' has come to mean the share
of the total activity or resources of a given segment of the economy accounted for by its
largest companies." BURrAU OF T=E CENsUs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Rrroar ON Co.NCrnA-ToN
RATIOS IN ANUFAcTURINa INDUSTRY-1963 FOR SUB. CONM. ON AN-lTRUsr AND ?*MONOroLY
OF SENATE CoMM. ON THE JUDICIARY xi (Comm. Print 1966); see, e.g., Hearings on Economic
Concentration Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Afonopoly of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 78 (testimony of Dr. John M. Blair),
at III (testimony of Willard F. Mueller) (1964). No one will deny that the Sherman and
Clayton Acts are biased against concentration. But the concentration which thes enact-
ments are designed to prevent is that which results in monopolization, undue restraint of
trade or substantial lessening of competition. In other words, they are not anti-concentra-
tion statutes simpliciter.
[84.] Brief for Appellant, p. 20. United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 84 US. 270 (1966).
[85.] Ibid.
[86.] Id. at 25-26, 32-33.
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Mr. Justice Black ignored the Solicitor General's argument. His
opinion does not discuss whether the Los Angeles grocery market was
beginning to show evidence of oligopoly, nor does he even refer to the
collective strength of the leading companies. To Mr. Justice Black, a
decrease in the number of separate competitors constitutes an increase
in concentration which, in his words, "is the crucial point here."8' 7
If the facts are examined in the context of the usual meaning of con-
centration, far from showing a tendency in that direction, economic
concentration in the market had in fact decreased. The market position
of Safeway, the leading chain, declined in the decade preceding the
merger from 14 to 8%,88 and the combined market shares of the leading
chains likewise declined over the same period.80
Nor is there any mention by Mr. Justice Black of the health and
intensity of competition in the retail grocery business in Los Angeles
-between chains and single stores, established firms and newcomers
alike; 90 of the ease of entry into the field;0 1 of the opportunities af-
forded for stores of all sizes by the population explosion in Los An-
geles;9 2 of the substantial turnover in the membership of the top 20
firms;93 of the fact that many of the acquisitions in the relevant market
were not horizontal, but rather market extensions; 4 or that fewer than
half of the stores of Von's and Shopping Bag were so situated as to be
able to compete with each other.90 Only by reading the perceptive
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart,99 joined by Mr. Justice
Harlan, can one appreciate the wealth of evidence that the majority
disregarded.
Mr. Justice Black evinces a similar preoccupation with concentration
in his other merger opinion of the past Term, Pabst.07 Pabst, the
nation's tenth largest brewer, acquired Blatz, which ranked eigh-
teenth,98 the new entity thereby becoming fifth with a market share
of 4.5 ..90 Three years later the merged company ranked third and its
[87.] 584 U.S. at 273 n.3
[88.] Id. at 290 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Stewart).
[89.] ibid.
[90.] Id. at 291-92.
[91.] Id. at 300.
[92.] Id. at 288.
[93.] Id. at 290.
[94.] Id. at 295.
[95.] Id. at 296.
[96.] Id. at 281.
[97.] United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
[98.] Id. at 547.
[99.] Id. at 550.
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market share had risen to 5.82o.100 Between 1934 and 1961 the number
of breweries in the nation declined from 714 to 229.101 The Court holds
that the Government had "no duty" to prove that the decline in the
number of competitors was due to mergers;20 - it makes no difference
what the reason was. In the period 1957-1961, the market share of the
top ten firms increased from 45% to almost 530.103 This evidence,
to Mr. Justice Black, was "amply sufficient to show a violation of § 7"
in the national market. 0 4
Putting Von's Grocery and Pabst together, the essence of the Court's
view on horizontal acquisitions appears to be this: the merger of two
successful competitors in a market in which the number of independent
competitive factors has been decreasing for a substantial period of
time is unlawful if the aggregate market share is 7.5%; and if, in addi-
tion, the combined market share of the leaders in the market has
increased, a merger producing a 4.5% share of the market contravenes
the statute.
The question remains whether such small percentages would have
sufficed to make out a violation if the number of competitors in the
market had not significantly declined or if the combined market shares
of the leading companies had not increased. The head of the Antitrust
Division apparently is not prepared to go that far. Shortly after Von's
was handed down, Professor Turner, in an interview with the press,
stated that the Government would proceed against a horizontal acquisi-
tion involving healthy competitors where each had a market share of
approximately 4% if the industry involved was tending towards con-
centration.10 5 He did not elaborate on what he meant by concentration,
but if he adheres to his prior writings, 00 he certainly would not be
content with a mere counting of noses.
The statistically oriented rules of Von's and Pabst do not, alone, tell
the whole story of the Supreme Court's merger decisions of 1966. After
all, market share percentages can be derived only after the geographic
and product markets have been delineated. In Pabst and Grinnell,07
the Court addressed itself to these concepts as well, and the full import
[100.] Ibid.
[101.] Ibid.
[102.] Id. at 552.[103.] Id. at 551.
[104.] Id. at 552.
[105.] N.Y. Times, June 1, 1966, p. 18, col. 1.
[106.] E.g., Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HLuv.
L. Rzv. 1313 (1965).[107.] United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.. 563 (1966).
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of last Term's developments under Section 7 can be appreciated only in
light of the opinions on the question of market definition.
The most hotly contested issue in Pabst was whether the State of
Wisconsin, as well as the nation as a whole, constituted a relevant
geographic market, for in that State the combined share of the two
brewers was 24%' 0 8--a figure in the area of presumptive illegality
under Philadelphia National Bank. Mr. Justice Black adopted this
market, but in the process appears to have stripped the geographic
market inquiry of much of its significance. The Court's opinion does
not refer to a single fact in support of its conclusion in this regard.
This was no oversight. The majority goes out of its way to deprecate
the importance of geographic market definition in Section 7 cases.
Again, Mr. Justice Black's opinion stems from an unsupported major
premise: "Congress did not seem to be troubled about the exact spot
competition might be lessened; it simply intended to outlaw mergers
which threatened competition in any or all parts of the country. ' 1 9
Thus, the Court held that, in a Section 7 case, it is enough for the
Government to "prove the merger may have a substantial anticom-
petitive effect somewhere in the United States-'in any section' of the
United States." 110
In other words, the Court ruled that in establishing the geographic
area within which the effect of a merger is to be measured, it is no
longer necessary to look to the facts in order to define an economically
meaningful market entity. In Mr. Justice Black's words, the market
need not be delineated "by metes and bounds as a surveyor would lay
off a plot of ground.""' The Justice goes on to tell us that any "section
of the country" means any spot in the United States where competition
might be lessened"--the legislative history to the contrary notwith-
standing.113
Ironically enough, the Government in Pabst did not seek the sweep-
ing victory it obtained. The Solicitor General's brief made a convincing
[108.] 384 U.S. at 551.
[109.] Id. at 549.
[110.] Ibid. (Emphasis by the Court.)
[111.] Ibid.
[112.] "Certainly the failure of the Government to prove by an army of expert witnesses
what constitutes a relevant 'economic' or 'geographic' market is not an adequate ground on
which to dismiss a § 7 case." Ibid.
[118.] "The deletion of the word 'community' in the original Act's description of the
relevant geographic market is another illustration of Congress' desire to indicate that its
concern was with the adverse effects of a given merger on competition only in an
economically significant 'section' of the country." Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370
U.S. 294, 320 (1962). (Emphasis added.) See the Court's summary of the relevant legislative
history, id. at 320 n.35.
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case for the proposition that, as a matter of economic reality, Wisconsin
was an appropriate geographic market."14 This persuasive evidence is
summarized in Mr. Justice Harlan's concurrence.nu The disturbing
and significant feature of Pabst is that Mr. Justice Black does not even
consider such evidence.
The Pabst approach to the geographic market issue is in sharp con-
trast to Philadelphia National Bank, where, whatever one may think
of the result, the Court took great pains to grapple with the issue.11
In Pabst, the question is treated cavalierly with the back of the hand.
As Justice Harlan states, the statutory phrase, "in any section of the
country," has been emasculated."17
The same disinterest in economic realities appears with regard to
the definition of the relevant product market. As I have previously
noted," 8 Alcoa-Rome" 9 and Continental Can'20 made clear that the
Court was willing to manipulate product markets to facilitate anti-
merger enforcement. This process reached its zenith in Mr. Justice
Douglas' opinion in Grinnell, which, although a monopoly decision,
is equally pertinent to the product market issue in merger cases.
Each of the defendants in Grinnell was engaged in supplying fire,
burglary or other kinds of property protection, all with a hook-up to a
central station.' 12 The defendants' protection was "accredited" by
insurance carriers, with the result that insurance rates were lower for
their customers.'m In ascribing a monopoly to the defendants, the
Supreme Court measured their market share, not in terms of the
business of fire protection only, or burglary protection only, or protec-
tion against other calamities, or all of these together. The measure
was not even the business of furnishing these services with a hook-up
to a central location. Instead, the market was held to be the business
of supplying fire and other protection (all lumped together) from a
central station and then, only when accredited by insurance com-
paniesm-a market which, in the dissenters' words the defendants'
[114.] Brief for Appellant, pp. 25-46, United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546
(1966).
[115.] 384 U.S. at 557-61.
[116.] United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357-62 (1963).
[117.] 384 U.S. at 555.
[118.] See, e.g., Handler 8- Robinson, The Supreme Court vs. Corporate Mergers,
Fortune, January, 1965, p. 164.
[119.] United States v. Aluminum Co., 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
[120.] United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
[121.] United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 566-67 (1966).
[122.] Id. at 567.
[123.] Id. at 571-75.
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business "fits neatly"'124 and "comes close to filling.' 125 As Mr. Justice
Fortas' dissent notes, it is simple to find unlawful market power if the
Court has "tailored the market to the dimensions of the defendants" 120
and utilizes a "strange, red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp
classification" of the relevant market.127
When the Von's-Pabst numbers game is added to the endless market
possibilities sanctioned by Pabst and Grinnell, the Court's rules on
horizontal mergers appear to provide the enforcement agencies with a
vast armory of weapons to attack horizontal mergers. Now that the
Court has spoken, the remaining question relates to the manner in
which the enforcement officials wield this enormous power. Having
regard for the number of mergers occurring each year,128 selective
enforcement becomes inevitable; there is plainly not enough govern-
ment manpower to proceed against every merger falling within the
ambit of Von's and Pabst with their new anti-concentration premise.
We can only hope that the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission will exercise their awesome administrative discretion with
prudence and objectivity. Blank checks have a habit of bouncing back.
On the policy level, the opinions unfortunately are singularly unil-
luminating. We are not told how the economy will be strengthened, the
public interest promoted or the cause of antitrust advanced by the arti-
ficial definition of markets and the conversion of Section 7 from a
prohibition of anticompetitive mergers into a ban on concentration.
Yet, after all, this is the basic issue. If mergers truly have anticompeti-
tive implications, they can be readily forbidden under the carefully
framed rules of Brown Shoe. When those rules are by-passed, one can
only assume, as the dissents fully document, that the challenged mer-
gers were not likely to impair competition in any properly defined
market. What then is the policy basis for preventing such mergers?
To me it is not enough to mouth such high-sounding generalities as
concentration and the protection of small business. I believe we are
[124.] Id. at 587.
[125.] Ibid.
[126.] Id. at 590.
[127.] Id. at 591.
[128.] The total number of mergers recorded for the 1960-1964 period by the Bureau
of Economics of the Federal Trade Commission is: 1960-1,345; 1961-1,724; 1962-1,667;
1963-1,479; 1964-1,797, Federal Trade Commission News Release, May 7, 1965. The
Commission's release notes that "the most reliable indication of long-term merger trends
is its continuing series of manufacturing and mining acquisitions collected from Moody's
Indumtrials and Standard Corporate Records." Those figures are: 1960-844; 1961-954;
1962-853; 1963-861; 1964-854.
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entitled to a bill of policy particulars so that the Court's inarticulate
premises can be openly debated.
IV. Monopolization
Most Sherman Act litigation arises under Section 1,'- with a Section
2130 charge thrown in as a mere make-weight. 3' The precise relationship
between the two sections has always been one of antitrust's major
perplexities. In Standard Oil of New Jersey,132 Chief Justice White
treated them as essentially synonymous, both being aimed at unreason-
able restraints of trade,133 but with Section 2 having a somewhat
broader reach, since a restraint not yet undue might be challenged as
an attempt to monopolize. 34 The more conventional approach, both in
the decided cases'35 and in the literature,130 has been to regard Section 1
as requiring a lesser degree of proof than Section 2, since a restraint
can be unlawful in the absence of monopoly power, whereas the
existence of undue market domination is integral to the offense of
monopolization. 37
Unlike its wealth of learning on restraint of trade, the common law
provided little illumination as to the meaning and scope of monopoly.'3s
Pure monopoly cases are extremely rare,139 and it took many years of
[129.] 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
[130.] 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
[131.] See, e.g., complaints in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., Civil
Action No. 66 Civ. 627 (N.D. IlL Filed April 7, 1966); United States v. United States
Aviation Underwriters, Inc., Civil Action No. 65 Civ. 2401 (S.D.N.Y. Filed August 5, 1965).
[132.] Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
[133.] [The second section seeks, if possible, to make the prohibitions of the act all
the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end prohibited
by the first section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to monopolize, or
monopolization thereof, even although the acts by which such results are attempted to
be brought about or are brought about be not embraced within the general enumera-
tion of the first section.
221 U.S. at 61.
[134.] Ibid.
[135.] See e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940):
It is the contract, combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce
which § 1 of the Act strikes down, whether the concerted activity be wholly nascent
or abortive on the one hand, or successful on the other... The existence or exertion
of power to accomplish the desired objective... [citing cases] becomes important only
in cases where the offense charged is the actual monopolizing of any part of trade or
commerce in violation of § 2 of the Act. An intent and a power to produce the result
which the law condemns are then necessary .... Only a confusion between the nature
of the offenses under those two sections... would lead to the conclusion that power
to fix prices was necessary for proof of a price-fixing conspiracy under § 1.
[136.] See e.g., Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUm. L. REv.
930, 932-937 (1962).
[137.] See note 135 supra.
[138.] See materials collected in HANDLER, CAsrs oN TRADE Rr.uULATI N 1-83 (3d ed.
1960).
[139.] For example, Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382
U.S. 172 (1965), and United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), were the first such
109
The Yale Law Journal
administration before the rules governing the various Section 2 of-
fenses crystallized.140 The past Term is quite unique in that the ambit
of our monopoly principles was explored in two of the Court's rulings.
The first of these was Walker Process,14 1 in which the narrow issue
was whether Section 2 may be violated by the maintenance and enforce-
ment of a fraudulently procured patent. The facts were these: Food
Machinery had obtained a patent for knee-action swing diffusers used
in aeration equipment for sewage treatment systems, and brought an
action against Walker, charging infringement. 42 Walker denied the
infringement, sought a declaratory judgment that the patent was
invalid, and counterclaimed for treble damages under Section 4 of the
Clayton Act,143 contending that Food Machinery had fraudulently
obtained and maintained its patent and, by so doing, had been guilty
of monopolization. 144 The alleged fraud was in the patentee's having
misrepresented to the Patent Office that its invention had not been in
public use for more than one year prior to the patent application when,
in fact, Food Machinery itself had been party to such prior use.146
The District Court'4" dismissed the counterclaim and the Seventh
Circuit 47 affirmed, both courts ruling that the remedy for fraud on the
Patent Office is a Government suit to cancel the patent, or a defense to
an infringement action, but that such fraud could not be used affir-
matively as the basis of an antitrust claim. On certiorari, the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed. 48
Mr. Justice Clark, for the Court, first rejects the contention that an
antitrust claim cannot be predicated upon a fraud on the Patent
cases to reach the Supreme Court since United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377 (1956) (Cellophane).
[140.] See United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 OD. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521
(1954).
[141.] Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
[142.] Id. at 173.
[143.] 38 Stat. 731, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
[144.] 382 U.S. at 174.
[145.] Id. at 173. Under the statutory scheme, the applicant may not be granted a
patent if, among other things, "the invention was patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or in sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States." 55
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1964).
[146.] The opinion of the District Court is unreported.
[147.] Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Walker Process Equip., Inc., 335 F.2d 315 (7th Cir.
1964).
[148.] In a separate concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan emphasized that the Court's
decision applied only to cases of deliberate fraud and should not be read to authorize the
use of private antitrust suits to "reach monopolies practiced under patents that for one
reason or another may turn out to be voidable under one or more of the numerous
technicalities attending the issuance of a patent." 382 U.S. at 180.
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Office.149 But he makes clear that a violation of Section 2 requires more
than proof of fraud. "To establish monopolization.., it [is] necessary
to appraise the exclusionary power of the illegal patent claim in terms
of the relevant market for the product involved."1 30 In other words, the
scope of the patent is not necessarily co-extensive with the relevant
product market; and the offense is not made out unless the threshold
element of monopoly power, in a meaningful economic sense, is proved.
Accordingly, the case was remanded for a hearing on the merits.
The Court's reasoning in Walker Process is eminently sound. The
monopoly resulting from a valid patent is, of course, immune from
antitrust liability emanating, as it does, from the Government pursuant
to explicit constitutional authority.15' Improper use of the patent may
create liability, but the grant itself is unassailable. If, however, the
patent is obtained through willful fraud, the grant is tainted and the
patentee has placed himself through misrepresentation in a position to
exclude others from a market which by right should be open to all.
Such an unwarranted market position having been secured, the ques-
tion becomes: What is the appropriate remedy? When the patent is
either co-extensive with an economically realistic product market or
commands a position of dominance within such a market, Section 2's
prohibition of monopolization is applicable, as the Court holds. Per
contra, when the patent does not confer upon its owner a dominant
position in a meaningful market, Section 2 does not come into play, the
proper remedy being cancellation of the patent or a defense against
infringement; but antitrust may not be invoked because there is no
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade and there is
no monopolization, there being no monopoly power.
The Court's other Section 2 decision of the past term was Grin-
nell..52 There the Government brought a civil action under Section 2
charging monopolization of the accredited central station service
protection industry by four affiliated firms'53 enjoying 875o of the
market as so defined. Over a substantial period of time, the defendants
had acquired 30 competing companies 4 and, at the time the complaint
[149.] Id. at 175.
[150.] Id. at 177.
[151.] U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, d. 8.
[152.] United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
1153.] Grinnell (which manufactures plumbing supplies and firc sprinkler systems)
owned 76% of the stock of American District Telegraph Co. (which provides burglary and
fire protection), 89% of the stock of Automatic Fire Alarm Co. of Delaware (which supplies
fire protection), and 100% of the stock of Holmes Electric Protective Co. (providing
burglary services). 384 U.S. at 566.
[154.] Ibid.
111
The Yale Law Journal
was filed, had a purchase offer outstanding for another.16 The defendant
companies also entered into restrictive agreements with each other
limiting the aspects of the business in which each would engage.Y50
Moreover, they reduced rates in competitive areas while renewing
contracts at increased rates in areas in which they had a substantial
monopoly position.157
In holding that Section 2 was violated on these facts, Mr. Justice
Douglas provided the following restatement of the law of monopoliza-
tion:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a conse-
quence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic acci-
dent.""
It will be noted that, under this formulation, the primary requisite to
a finding of monopolization is the existence of monopoly power. Mr.
Justice Douglas does not pause to define this crucial term, but there
is no suggestion in the opinion of any departure from the traditional
definition of monopoly power as the "power to control prices or
exclude competition."15 Since the existence or absence of such power
cannot be determined in the abstract, it is essential to measure the
defendant's position within a defined market.
But a finding of monopoly power does not mark the end of the
inquiry. There must also be a willful acquisition or maintenance of
that power. This language marks the Court's current interpretation
of the teaching of Alcoa160 and United Shoe Machinery'(" that not all
monopolies are unlawful. Justice Douglas' succinct synthesis does not
catalogue the myriad of facts which may constitute willful acquisition
or maintenance. He does, of course, distinguish the unlawful conduct
from "growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident." It is noteworthy that the met-
aphor of power thrust upon the monopolist is not indulged. That
(155.] Id. at 568.
[156.] Id. at 568-70.
[157.] Id. at 570.
[158.) Id. at 570-71.
[159.] United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
[160.] United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
[161.]. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
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concept had produced great conceptual difficulty0 2 and did not begin
to indicate the full scope of the exemption of lawful monopolies from
Section 2's strictures.163
The difficulty with Grinnell arises not from its legal principles but
from its market determination. Once the Court defined the market
as accredited central station service protection, the case was over. The
defendants controlled 87% of that market, and had willfully acquired
and maintained that position.
In the four years that have elapsed since Brown Shoe"t was decided,
we have become accustomed to the Court's constructing markets
broadly to endow a conglomerate merger with horizontality. Likewise,
we are no longer surprised to find the Court fragmenting a market both
as to product or geographical scope when this magnifies market shares
and enlarges the dimension of the acquisition.
I have frequently stated that the delineation of the relevant market
is an economic matter and must correspond to business reality.20 5 This
is especially imperative under Section 2, which is a criminal statute.
To stigmatize an enterprise as monopolistic is fraught with serious
consequences, of which the drastic remedy of divestiture is but one.
Virtually all of the restraints which have been upheld under the rule of
reason, both at common law and under the antitrust statutes, are
uniformly condemned when the defendant possesses monopoly power.
Thus, a seller with monopoly power may not enter into exclusive
representation arrangements whereby he contracts not to sell to more
than one buyer in a particular locality'60 --a restraint which, absent
monopoly, has been traditionally upheld as reasonable.07 Similarly,
exclusive dealing arrangements at common law,108 under the Sherman
Act 69 and under Section 3 of the Clayton Act,1 0 have been con-
[162.] See Handler, Some Unresolved Problems of Antitrust, 62 CoLuss. L. R . 930, 934
(1962).
[163.] ibid. See also Handler, Annual Antitrust Review, 11 TAz RcoRnD 867, 894-95
(1956).
[164.] Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
[165.] E.g., Handler & Robinson, The Supreme Court vs. Corporate fergers, Fortune,
January, 1965, p. 164. The nature and extent of a market cannot %-ary depending on
whether the case arises under the Clayton or Sherman Act. One would, therefore, expect
that the Court, as it did in Grinnell, would treat as applicable in a Section 2 Sherman Act
litigation its market precedents in Section 7 Clayton Act cases. But the application of these
precedents to the facts of Grinnell lays bare their essential unsoundnes.
[166.] See cases cited in Robinson, Restraints on Trade and the Orderly Marketing of
Goods, 45 CoasErLm L.Q. 254,257 nn.17-19 (1960).
[167.] E.g., Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418, 421 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
[168.] See HANLtER, ANTrrausr IN PERSPEcrnT. ch. 2 (1957).
[169.] See cases cited in Robinson, supra note 166, at 275 n.105.
1170.] E.g., Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co., 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
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demned when entered into by a firm dominating the relevant market.
The same rule of illegality applies to territorial and customer restric-
tions imposed on buyers to foster the orderly marketing of the seller's
goods, when the seller is a monopolist.17'
In view of these severe side effects of a finding of monopoly, the
adoption of a tailor-made definition of the market may well produce
grave injustice. If the courts hold as a matter of law that there are
no competitors when in fact there are, a defendant may be placed at
a serious competitive disadvantage and competition throttled rather
than preserved. Our modem economy has developed along lines which
reward the firm able to differentiate its product successfully from that of
its competitors. If product markets may be fashioned to fit the defen-
dant's peculiar marketing patterns, almost any producer or vendor
of a non-fungible product may become vulnerable to the charge of
monopoly. This would inevitably depreciate the entire monopoly con-
cept and introduce further confusion into our antitrust jurisprudence.
I would like to believe that, as precedent, Grinnell is nothing more
than a misapplication of perfectly valid principles to the sui generis
facts of that case and that it does not portend a segmentation of
markets to the point where undue market power disappears as an
ingredient of a Section 2 offense.
V. Preliminary Injunctions and the FTC
The Supreme Court's propensity to decide antitrust cases on broad
policy grounds reached its high-water mark in Dean Foods.172 Mr.
Justice Clark's opinion for a five-justice majority'" confers upon the
Federal Trade Commission the right to seek a preliminary injunction
from a court of appeals in merger cases. Mr. Justice Fortas' masterly dis-
sent 74 demonstrates that the ruling is not only bad law, but bad
administration and bad policy as well.
Dean, the third or fourth largest distributor of packaged milk in
the Chicago area, agreed to acquire the assets of Bowman, which ranked
second, the merged company constituting a 23% market factor.17 The
plan was for Dean to acquire fixed assets, receivables and good will,
[171.] See Handler, Recent Antitrust Developments, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 159, 163 (1963),
For another example of the limitations placed on monopolists see LaPeyre v. FTC, 1966
TRADE REG. REP. $] 71881 (5th Cir. 1966).
[172.] FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
[173.] The Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan concurred in Justice
Clark's opinion for the Court.
[174.] Justices Harlan, Stewart and White joined in the dissent.
[175.] 584 U.S. at 602.
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with Bowman retaining cash, securities and real estate investments for
distribution to its stockholders. 7 0 Dean then planned to dispose of
most of Bowman's retail milk routes, certain of its plants and equip-
ment, and to consolidate the remaining assets. 7
The Federal Trade Commission issued a complaint alleging a viola-
tion of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. Because the Commission has no
statutory authority to issue preliminary injunctions, and the district
courts' jurisdiction is limited to cases brought by either the United
States or private parties,'", the Commission petitioned the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit under the All Writs Act 70 for a
preliminary injunction to maintain the status quo pending the outcome
of the Commission proceeding. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, ruling that the Commission "did not have authority to in-
stitute this proceeding."'8s0 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded
for the Court of Appeals to decide on the merits whether an injunction
should issue.
The All Writs Act provides that federal courts may "issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law."' 8 ' As applicable to the
courts of appeals, the statute has generally been construed to permit the
issuance of a writ, usually mandamus, to protect the court's appellate
jurisdiction 8 2 Mr. Justice Clark held that this statute authorized the
granting of preliminary relief to the Commission in merger cases when
an impending sale or commingling of assets threatens its ability to
devise an effective divestiture remedy after decision on the merits. This
result was reached in spite of the fact that the Commission had, for
many years, sought authority in Congress either to issue preliminary
injunctions itself or to petition for such relief in the district courts,
and that Congress had repeatedly refused to confer such authoriza-
tion.183 To Mr. Justice Clark, this history had "no relevance what-
[176.] Id. at 599.
[177]. Ibid.
[178.] See 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1964) (suits by the United States). 38 Stat.
737, as amended (1914) 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1964) (suits by private parties).
[179.] 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1964): "The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdic.
tions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." See generally 6 Moorx, FEnmaL
PRACnc 54.10 (2d ed. 1965).
[180.] FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 356 F.2d 481,482 (7th Cir. 1966.
[181.] See note 179 supra.
[182.] See La Buy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957); Roche v. Evaporated Milk
Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21 (1943); McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910). See generally 6 MooRE,
FEnazAL PRAcmca 54.10[4 (2d ed. 1965).
[183.] The Commission's persistent efforts to obtain legislation resting it with standing
to seek preliminary injunctive relief began in early 1956, following two unreported opinions
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ever."' s4 To deny the courts of appeals power to grant preliminary re-
lief under the All Writs Act would "stultify congressional purpose." 186
The majority opinion, to the dissenters, flies in the face of the
careful enforcement scheme set forth in the Clayton Act; 80 it disre-
gards the limited construction given the All Writs Act in prior decis.
ions; 8 7 it perverts the proper functioning of appellate courts;188 and it
disregards ten years of legislative history. 80 Nevertheless, the precise
holding of the case is narrower than might be supposed.
Since the Commission's only route to a preliminary injunction is via
the All Writs Act, it faces an initial jurisdictional hurdle not confronted
by the Department of Justice when it seeks preliminary relief in a
district court. Acts which do not threaten to destroy present or prospec-
tive jurisdiction are beyond the scope of the statute. Accordingly,
unless the Commission can show, as it did in Dean Foods, that an
ultimate order of divestiture or other relief would be ineffectual, the
courts of appeals would have no jurisdiction to issue a preliminary
injunction, no matter how clear it may be that a merger violated
Section 7. For example, in a case involving a pure conglomerate acquisi-
tion where the acquired company is to be maintained as a separate
entity with no commingling of assets, a threat to the court of appeals'
appellate jurisdiction could not be shown, and an injunction there-
fore would not issue.
Furthermore, even if the court of appeals is satisfied on the jurisdic-
tional necessity for an injunction, the inquiry is not over. The court
must still apply the traditional standards of equity and antitrust to
decide whether the injunction should issue. The Commission must
prove a "reasonable probability" that the merger is unlawful. 10 0 The
reaching conclusions contrary to Dean Foods. FTC v. Farm Journal, Inc. (3d Cir. 1955),
In re A. G. Spalding & Bros., Inc. (1st Cir. 1955). Subsequently, the Second Circuit, in
FTC v. International Paper Co., 241 F.2d 372, 373 (1956), also held that the All Writs Act
provided the Commission with "no authority to seek an injunction." During the ensuing
decade, 37 bills of the Commission were introduced in Congress. None of these bills was
enacted. See generally Appendix to Opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas, 384 U.S. at 636.40.
184.] Id. at 611.
185.3 Id. at 606.
[186.] Id. at 615-22.
[187.] Id. at 622-30.
[188.1 Id. at 630-36.
[189.1 Id. at 613, 619. See also Appendix to Opinion of Mr. Justice Fortas, id. at 636-40.
[190.] See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963); Crane
Co. v. Briggs Manufacturing Co., 280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960), affirming per curiam, 185
F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich. 1960); United States v. Aluminium Ltd., 1965 Trade Cas. 71366
(D.N.J. 1965); United States v. Chrysler Corp., 232 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.J. 1964); United States
v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 223 F. Supp. 849 (N.D. Cal. 1963). Compare United States v.
FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817, 823 (N.D. Cal. 1963), (government "failed to demonstrate that
it has a clear probability of obtaining the final relief demanded'), appeal dismissed, 321
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court must balance the equities.191 It must weigh the possible injury to
the public against the harm to the merging parties 1 2 and consider
the availability of less drastic relief, such as an order requiring separate
functioning of the acquired company, pendente lite.0 13 Only when the
balance tips decidedly towards the Commission may an injunction be
forthcoming.194
If my analysis is correct, the practical effect of the decision may be
quite limited. This was the conclusion reached by the Solicitor General
in his brief on behalf of the Commission:
[T]he courts of appeals will not be inundated by applications of
the Commission. Such applications will be made sparingly, be-
F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1963), application denied, 84 S. Ct. 4, 11 L. Ed. 2d 20 (1963) (Goldberg.
J.); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir. 1952 ("plaintiff
has raised questions going to the merits ... [that are] serious, substantial, difficult and
doubtful. . ...)
[191.] The overwhelming majority of courts hold the government must establish
irreparable injury. E.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963);
United States v. Parents Magazine Enterprises, Inc., 1962 TRADE CAs. 9 70437 (N.D. 111.
1962); United States v. Gimbel Bros., 1962 TRADE CAs. 7 0284 (E.D. Wis. 1962); United
States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 1962 TRADE CAs. 9 70380 (W.D.N.Y. 1962); United
States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 1961 TRADE CAs. 9 70131 (N.D. Cal. 1961); United States
v. Aluminum Co. (Alcoa-Rome), 1960 TRADE CAs. S 69727 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); United States
v. Von's Grocery Co., 1960 TRADE CAs. 69698 (S.D. Cal. 1960); United States v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 1959 TRADE CAs. 69250 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. Continental Can
Co., 1956 TRADE CAs. 68479 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
Although the Third Circuit in Ingersoll-Rand, supra, note 190, stated that the United
States, unlike a private party, need not show irreparable injury, the court did inquire
"whether a subsequent divestiture would or would not adequately protect the public
interest." 320 F.2d at 523. See also United States v. Chrysler Corp., supra note 190, at 659.
Cf. United States v. Brown Shoe Co., 1956 TRADE CAs. 9 68244, at 71116 (E.D. Mo. 1956)
(rejecting "irreparable injury" requirement in government case, but granting only limited
relief because of the "weakness of plaintiff's case.')
[192.] E.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 218 F. Supp. 817 (N.D. Cal. 1963); United States
v. Gimbel Bros., 1962 TRADE CAs. 70284 (E.D. Wis. 1962); United States v. Standard Oil
Co. (Indiana), 1961 TRADE CAs. 70131 (N.D. Cal. 1961); United States v. Aluminum Co.,
1960 TRADE CAs. 69727 (N.D.N.Y. 1960); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 1960 TRAE
CAs. 69698 (S.D. Cal. 1960); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 1959 TRAnE CAs.
69250 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); United States v. Continental Can Co., 1956 TRE CrAs. 9 63479
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
[193.] See, e.g., United States v. Aluminium Ltd., 1965 TRADE CAs. 9 71366 (D.N.J.
1966). Footnote 21 of the Solicitor General's brief in the Supreme Court in the Dean Foods
case reads: "Mhe prospect of preliminary relief in the courts of appeals may be expected
to encourage parties to Commission merger cases to enter into voluntary agreements for
maintaining separate operations which preserve the possibility of unscrambling the
merged assets if the merger is finally held to be illegal." Brief for Petitioner, p. 42, FTC v.
Dean Foods Co., 584 U.S. 597 (1966).
[194.] On the remand of Dean Foods, the Seventh Circuit, on July 18, 1966, issued a
preliminary injunction against the merger, effective for four months. See A.T.T.R., No. 263,
p. A-1 (July 26, 1966). Although no opinion accompanied the Seventh Circuit's order,
manifestly the court imposed the four-month deadline because it was mindful of the
injury that would befall Dean and Bowman if the Commission did not proceed with
extraordinary speed. One week after the Court's order, the Commission directed the
hearing examiner to file his initial decision on or before September 9, 1966, so that the
Commission could enter its final order before the expiration of its deadline. On Sep.
tember 7, 1966, the hearing examiner held the merger lawful under the "failing company"
doctrine. Dean Foods Co. and Bowman Dairy Co., TRADE Rrc. REP. S 17682, at 22983.
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cause many merger cases can proceed without preliminary relief
and because the Commission is mindful that "all writs" jurisdic-
tion is an extraordinary power to be invoked only in emergency
situations1 95
On the other hand, experience has taught that when the Govern-
ment rests its arguments on a narrow ground of decision, once a favor-
able result is obtained, it is used in later cases to support broader con-
tentions. 96 If that history is repeated, applications to the courts of
appeals for preliminary relief may become routine.
I The important feature of Dean Foods to me is that the Court, having
essayed the role of policy making instead of confining itself to matters
-of statutory construction, legislative history and precedent, has come
forth with bad policy. Reasonable men may differ as to whether the
Commission itself should be empowered to apply to the district courts
for preliminary relief instead of having to enlist the aid of the Depart-
ment of Justice.19 7 But what justification is there for saddling already
overburdened appellate courts with responsibilities that they are ill-
equipped to discharge and which can be better performed by trial
judges? The issues on petitions for injunctions in merger cases are
quite complex; to do justice to the parties a full dress evidentiary
hearing may be necessary; 9 s the hearing is in reality a trial and may
require several days as a minimum. Does it make sense to convert
appellate into trial courts and to have three judges do the work that
may more efficiently be done by one?
I If the courts of appeals afford the parties a real hearing, their
appellate dockets must inevitably suffer; if injunctions automatically
issue as a matter of course, the bitter lessons of the evils of trial by affi-
davit and rule by injunction will have been ignored.
The Supreme Court had no avenue open to it other than the All
Writs Act by which to give the Commission the power it sought. Un-
like a legislative body, it could not vest the district courts with power
to grant injunctions under the usages and principles of equity. This
only serves to illustrate the limited capacity of courts to fashion policy
and the unsatisfactory results which obtain when those limits are
[195.] Brief for Petitioner, p. 42, FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597 (1966).
[196.] See the progression of the position of the Government in merger cases since
Brown Shoe.
[197.] Compare the majority opinion in Dean Foods, 384 U.S. at 605.07, with the
dissenting opinion, id. at 615-22.
[198.] See id. at 630-35 (dissenting opinion).
118
Vol. 76: 92, 1966
Antitrust Policymaking
breached. It is well to remember that the judiciary is not the only
branch of government capable of governing.',)
VI. Intra-corporate Conspiracy
In a little noted decision last year,2 0 the Federal Trade Commission
resurrected one of the weirdest concepts ever to rear its head in antitrust
jurisprudence-the doctrine of intra-corporate conspiracy.
Under a consent order entered in 1954, Schenley Industries had
been prohibited from conspiring, combining or even consulting with
any of its subsidiaries or affiliated companies with respect to prices and
related matters.201 The order had been agreed to in the wake of the
Yellow Cab,202 Timken2°3 and Kiefer-Stewar20 4 cases at a time when our
antitrust enforcement agencies were singing Mr. Justice Black's spine-
chilling refrain: "The fact that there is common ownership or control
of the contracting corporations does not liberate them from the impact
of the antitrust laws."' 205 Having champed under this strait jacket for
more than a decade, Schenley decided to do something about it. What
it did was to petition the Commission for a modification of the order,
claiming that since its entry the law had changed and hence its restric-
tions on intra-corporate activity were no longer warranted.
The Commission rejected Schenley's application out of hand. In a
terse statement, it asserted that it did "not agree with [Schenley] that
there has been a change in law in this area of intracorporate conspiracy
nor that the doctrine has been discredited over the years since 1951."20
In one sense, the Commission was right. The cases it cited are still
on the books, and the Supreme Court has not had occasion to reconsider
their sweeping language. But, as a practical matter, in the past decade
the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine had fallen into disuse. The
Department of Justice for some years has entered into numerous con-
sent decrees which exclude intra-corporate activities from their in-
junctive prohibitions;20 7 the Commission itself, apart from the consent
[199.] See Brandeis, J. dissenting in International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248
U.S. 215, 264-67 (1918). Cf. Harlan, Thoughts at a Dedication: Keeping the Judicial Func-
tion in Balance, 49 A.B.A.J. 943 (1963).
[200.] Schenley Industries Inc., TRADE Rro. REP. 17353, at 22251 (Oct. 25, 1965).
[201.] Schenley Industries, Inc., 50 F.T.C. 747 (1954).[202.] United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
[203.] Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
[204.] Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
[205.] Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 841 U.S. 593, 59 (1951).
[206.] TRADE REG. REP. V 17353, at 22523 (Oct. 25, 1965).
[207.] Two major forms of exclusionary clauses have been employed. The first reads:
'Tor the purpose of this Final Judgment, defendant and its subsidiaries, officers, directors,
agents, servants and employees or any of them, shall be deemed to be one person." This
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orders against the major distillers, has not attacked intra-enterprise
arrangements; and the present head of the Antitrust Division, in
August of 1965, stated that:
We should not press to the limits afforded by past decisions wher-
ever on present evaluation those decisions appear to have gone
too far. We should not, for example, attempt to push the intra-
corporate conspiracy doctrine as far as a free-wheeling interpre-
tation of the Timken case might suggest.208
Against this background, the Commission's ruling in Schenley came
as an unpleasant surprise.
What do we mean when we speak of intra-corporate conspiracy?
Simply stated, this doctrine puts agreements eliminating competition
among the member companies of a corporate family on the same plane
and subject to the same antitrust rules as agreements among legally
independent and separately owned and controlled businesses. In other
words, under this doctrine it is just as unlawful for two subsidiaries of
Schenley to fix the prices of I. W. Harper and Dewar's White Label
as it is for Schenley and Seagram to enter into price agreements with
each other.
There is a structural difference of great significance between the
first and second sections of the Sherman Law. Section 1 forbids con-
tracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade; it does not
prohibit restraints of trade as such. Section 2, on the other hand, outlaws
monopolization as well as combinations and conspiracies to monopolize.
Thus Section 1, unlike Section 2, requires a plurality of actors for
its violation; it takes at least two people to contract, to combine or to
type of clause was used in: United States v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 1965 TRAvE CAS. 71570
(D. Kans. 1965) (prohibiting exclusive dealing and customer, territorial and price restric-
dons); United States v. Studebaker Corp., 1965 TRADE CAS. 71410 (D. Nev. 1965) (customer
and territorial restrictions; resale price maintenance); United States v. Elgin Corp., 1965
TRADE CAs. 71339 (N.D. 111. 1965) (territorial and customer restrictions); United States v.
Kaynar Mfg. Co., 1964 TRADE CAS. 71121 (S.D. Cal. 1964) (horizontal price-fixing and
collusive bidding); United States v. J. L. Hammett Co., 1964 TRADE CAS. 71178 (E.D. Pa.
1964) (horizontal price-fixing, collusive bidding and market allocation); United States v.
Honeywell, Inc., 1964 TRADE C. 71224 (D. Minn. 1964) (horizontal .price-fixng, collusive
bidding and market allocation); United States v. Greater New York Roll Bakers Ass'n, Inc.,1964 TRADEv CAs. 71265 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (horizontal price-fxing).
The second basic form of exclusionary provision reads: 'The provisions of this Final
Judgment shall not apply to transactions solely between the defendant and its officers,
directors, agents, employees, servants and subsidiaries, or any of them." It was used in
United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1965 TRADE CM. 71330 (N.D. I11. 1965) (horizontal
price-fixing and market allocation) (adding "parent company' and "affiliates"); United
States v. American Cyanamid Co., 1964 TRADE CAs. 71466 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (divestiture,
production limitations and compulsory patent licensing ordered; price.fixing, market
sharing and other marketing practices prohibited).
[208.] Turner, Address Before the American Bar Association, 10 ANRsUST BULL. 685,
687 (1965).
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conspire. Under Section 2, however, a single person, by himself, can
monopolize or attempt to monopolize. It is only when the Section 2
charge is conspiracy to monopolize that there must be more than one
person involved in the wrongdoing.
It has long been the law that when a company monopolizes an
industry, the directors who authorize or participate in the challenged
corporate action may be guilty of conspiracy with the corporation and
each other to monopolize in violation of Section 2.203 There is no
conceptual difficulty in such an idea, and nothing strange about holding
directors liable for conspiring to commit the crime which the corpora-
tion can itself perpetrate alone. And if the monopoly scheme is carried
out by a group of affiliated companies, there manifestly is no difficulty
in charging the group with the collective crime of monopolization
or with conspiracy to monopolize.210
Under Section 1, however, where the corporation by itself is incapable
of violating the statute, serious theoretical and practical problems arise
when the members of the same corporate family are proceeded against.
Let us consider a few examples.
Is it price-fixing for the officers and directors of a company to consult
with one another on the prices to be charged for the products the
company makes? Are they guilty of a conspiracy to curtail production
when they order a shutdown of their facilities when demand slackens?
Are they illegally dividing markets when they establish branch sales
offices in various parts of the country?
If the plurality of actors demanded by Section 1 were satisfied by the
officers and directors of a single company, then no corporate action
would be immune from antitrust attack. Even an individual proprietor-
ship could not transact any business without violating the antitrust
laws.
Needless to say, not even the most extreme partisan of antitrust has
ever suggested so bizarre a rule.
We can thus start with the postulate that the internal decisions and
actions of a single corporation, though formulated or executed by more
than one person, are not subject to the prohibitions of Section 1. There
must be a concert of action with some other legal entity.
Is that concert to be found in the relations between a parent and
its subsidiaries or among affiliated companies?
[209.] See, e.g., Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599, 618 (6th Cir. 1915), ceirt. denied,
238 U.S. 635 (1915).
[210.] Cf. United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338 (1949).
121
The Yale Law Journal
Let us suppose that a corporation markets several brands through
several subsidiaries. Or that its various functions such as production,
selling and financing are carried on by separate subsidiaries. Or, finally,
that it operates regionally through separate selling subsidiaries.
If the parent company sets the subsidiaries' prices, or if it instructs
them not to deal with a particular customer or limits them to defined
territories, are the constituent companies engaged in price-fixing,
boycotting or dividing markets?
Suppose the officers of the parent confer from time to time with the
executives of the subsidiaries on prices and terms and conditions of sale.
Are such normal consultations evidence of an unlawful combination?
It is fatuous to require a corporation to compete with itself. There
is nothing inherently anti-competitive in the use of subsidiaries. It
is, of course, true that there are technical grounds for applying the
conspiracy concept literally to the acts of related companies. Each
corporation is a separate legal entity, so that joint action of two or more
partakes of the essential legal characteristics of conspiracy. But antitrust
is concerned with substance and not mere form.
What social objective is attained by compelling subsidiaries to com-
pete with one another? I can see none. The Sherman Act properly
requires that the external relations of any business be competitive and
not collusive. But to demand internal competition within a business
unit as well is to invite chaos without promoting the public welfare.
Moreover, there can be no rational validity to a doctrine which can
be easily circumvented by consolidating all affiliated and subsidiary
companies into one corporation.
Is there any reason to assume that, if a family of companies is
treated as a single unit, the door will be opened wide for antitrust
violation? I see none. If the corporate group possesses or exercises
monopoly power, Section 2 will close the door tightly whether the
group be treated as one or several entities. Similarly, if the objective
of the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine is to prevent unified stock
ownqership in companies which historically were competitive and inde-
pendent, an effective tool is available in the antimerger provisions of
Section 7 of the Clayton Act and there is no need to stretch the con-
spiracy concept to the breaking point.
In sum, there was no rational basis or any pressing enforcement need
for the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine when first announced and
there is no such basis or need today. The plain fact is that intra-corporate
conspiracy makes absolutely no sense, legal or economic, and should be
flatly repudiated.
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VII. Less Restrictive Alternatives
In a recent address, the Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division proposed a new yardstick for measuring antitrust
legality. Referring specifically to vertical territorial restrictions, Pro-
fessor Turner suggested that illegality should hinge on whether "the
agreements [are] more restrictive than is necessary to achieve the legiti-
mate purposes which they are claimed to serve."21 A restraint should be
upheld only if no less restrictive alternative is available. This test
may appear, at first blush, to be plausible and unobjectionable; on
analysis, it strips the rule of reason of any genuine content.
A vertical territorial restriction is an agreement whereby the seller
restricts his dealers with regard to the geographical areas in which they
may resell his product.21- It serves several vital functions in the dis-
tribution of goods. To obtain optimum sales coverage, a manufacturer
must secure a network of dealers who are willing and able to provide
effective promotion, advertising and service. It is not easy to find dealers
who will assume the risks inherent in distribution without some
guarantee that their efforts will bear fruit, particularly where sub-
stantial pre-sale effort is necessary or after-sale service is important
in maintaining the product's good will. Territorial restrictions provide
such assurances by protecting the dealer from intrabrand competition,
thus leaving him free to channel his energies towards the more vital
interbrand competitive struggle.
Moreover, if the seller desires to achieve maximum market penetra-
tion, he must encourage his dealers to exploit the potential of their
territories to the fullest possible extent. By overextending himself into
neighboring territories, a dealer may spread himself too thin and
neglect his duties in the home area. Furthermore, the temptation to
steal the easy sale from his neighboring dealer-"skimming the cream"
-may sacrifice the more difficult sale at home to the competing brand
and, even more important, the neighboring dealer who needs some
"cream" to sustain his business may be forced to drop the product
as unprofitable. This is particularly so when the product requires pre-
selling since the local dealer may not only lose his expected profit, but
incur a loss. And when after-sale service is important, the local dealer
[211.] Turner, Some Reflections on Antitrust, 1966 N.Y. STATr BAn AssocmATio. ANnr-
tausT LAWv SYmPosiuM 4.
[212.] The following material is derived from a statement by the author delivered
before the Small Business Administration on March 11, 1966 and reprinted at 11 AmnusTr
Bun.. 417 (1966).
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may not do as good a job of servicing a product sold by someone else,
the net result being customer dissatisfaction.
Despite all of these factors, Professor Turner concludes that, except
where a new firm or a new product is involved, "there are ample
alternative devices, all less restrictive than territorial restraints,
whereby a manufacturer can attempt to achieve an efficient, aggressive
marketing system," 213 and accordingly "that territorial restrictions are
[not] reasonably necessary to any legitimate purpose .. ,,214 Although
the Assistant Attorney General does not go into specifics, the less
restrictive alternatives he has in mind are probably primary responsi-
bility clauses215 and profit pass-overs. 216
There can, of course, be no doubt that such provisions are less
restrictive than territorial restraints; but Professor Turner provides no
evidence that they can successfully achieve the purposes sought by
territorial restrictions. It apparently is enough for him that alternatives
exist.
But what about the business man? Why should he be required to
experiment with less restrictive (and possibly less effective and less
practical) alternatives on pain of incurring severe antitrust liability?
Why should he be second-guessed by economic theoreticians because
he has elected to cope with his distribution problems in a business-like
manner, selecting the arrangements which promise to be most effective
from a business point of view?
The fundamental fallacy in this approach is that, no matter what the
restraint, there will almost always be a less restrictive alternative, and
indeed, further alternatives to each alternative ad infinitum. Since
Professor Turner has suggested that his rule should apply to antitrust
in general as well as in the area of vertical restraints, a few examples of
its unworkability in other areas will serve to illustrate my point.
How would the Turner thesis operate in the field of industrial
mergers? There is obviously a less restrictive alternative to every
merger; the acquiring company can expand internally. Does this mean
[213.] Turner, supra note 211, at 6.
[214.] Id. at 4-5.
[215.] Primary responsibility clauses authorize the assignment to dealers of territories
in which they will be primarily responsible for sales and generally permit termination of
the dealerships for failure to adequately represent the sellers in those territories. See
Paragraph IV(D) of the decree in United States v. Philco Corp., 1956 TRADE C. 68409,
at 71753 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
[216.] Profit pass-overs provide for a sharing of profits on sales made by dealers outside
their own territories in order to compensate the dealers in whose territory the sales have
been made for the loss of those sales. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253,
270-71 (1963) (concurring opinion of Brennan, J.).
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that whenever the acquiring company possesses sufficient capital to
expand, the merger path is closed to it? Suppose a manufacturer seeks
to acquire distribution outlets by acquisition. Is such vertical forward
integration to be forbidden because a less restrictive alternative is
available-a requirements contract with the company to be acquired?
But what about the requirements contract itself? Isn't there a less
restrictive alternative-namely, a partial requirements contract? Sup-
pose the contract requires the buyer to buy 80%o of his needs. Will the
seller be told that he has violated the law because a 40% agreement
was possible? How about 25%? Or take a covenant not to compete.
It is always possible to cut down the spatial and temporal scope of the
restriction until it becomes meaningless. If we must search endlessly
for less restrictive alternatives, inevitably we must end up with no
restraint at all-which is another way of saying that there is to be no
rule of reason in antitrust any more.
I am not suggesting for a moment that Professor Turner's question
about the reasonable necessity of a restraint is not a proper question
or that the existence of available alternatives is not a relevant factor.
My objections are two-fold: a restraint should not be condemned, in
the abstract, merely because it is theoretically possible to conjure up
less restrictive alternatives; the legality of a restraint must be related
to the basic antitrust goal of preserving competition and preventing
monopoly. If the restraint promotes and does not suppress competition,
it should be upheld under the rule of reason despite the availability
of less restrictive alternatives. This was the wise counsel of Justice
Brandeis2 17 to which we should adhere.
VIII. Conclusion
The central theme of Cardozo's writings was that the judge in his
creative role of lawmaker must strike a delicate balance between
stability and change, order and progress. Under this view, judicial
policy-making was to be limited to interstitial changes. In antitrust,
a less modest conception of the scope of judicial law making has been
in vogue in recent years, particularly in the cases I have reviewed in
this paper. It must, of course, be recognized that the judicial process
inescapably involves a choice of policy. What differentiates the present
situation is the magnitude of the policy decisions. Perhaps later Courts
may revert to a more circumscribed view of the proper role of judges
[217.] Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231,238 (1918).
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in the policy area, but no such retreat is likely on the part of the
present Court.218 The vital question, therefore, is how can the bar and
the academic community best assist the courts in making good policy?
As Justice Harlan has put it: "Constructive criticism of judicial
decisions, as with other aspects of the work of the courts, is a good thing
for the judiciary and for healthy development of the law. Only a
warped judicial outlook could think otherwise. '219 Continuing, he
writes: "Much of the useful criticism of judicial decisions, whether
from the standpoint of substance or professional quality, now comes
from the law schools. I believe it would be of great value were their
output to be supplemented on an organized basis by bar critiques
bringing to bear the points of view of active practitioners on important
cases."12 20
But enlightened criticism is not enough. If the bar is to render
maximum assistance to the courts, consonant with the noble traditions
of our profession, the practitioner must be trained in preparing records
and in making arguments which will enable the courts to decide policy
questions wisely.22' Training future practitioners and judges in the
delicate art of policy making will require revolutionary changes in both
the curriculum and the teaching techniques of our various law
schools. 22 2 Along with these changes, I would hope that the courts would
stop disguising their innovations by fictitiously ascribing them to the
legislators, that they would with the fullest candor make their policy
postulates explicit, and that they would welcome from counsel argu-
ments touching upon the jugular policy issues. 223
[218.] N.Y. Times, July 27, 1966, p. 1, col. 6. See also N.Y. Times, July 31, 1966, Sec-
tion IV, p. 6, col. 1.
[219.] Harlan, supra note 199, at 945.
[220.] Ibid.
[221.] See Bickel, Is the Warren Court Too "Political"?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1966,
Section 6, Part 1, p. 30.
[222.] See Address by the author before a Seminar on The Training of the Practitioner,
Rutgers University School of Law, September 10, 1966.
[223.] The courts in antitrust cases have in the past often refused to entertain argu-
ments based primarily on policy, stating that such arguments should be addressed solely
to Congress. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513, 525-26 (S.DN.Y.
1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 552
(1966).
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